





Writing more than forty-five years ago, Marlan Blisset put it very clearly (1972, p. 2): 
[P]resent scientific growth is unimaginable without institutional means for 
coordinating the dynamics of research and directing these activities against 
increasingly specific problems.  
What Blisset gestured towards is a new approach to epistemology. If you want to understand 
how knowledge grows – how we learn new things or develop more reliable knowledge, and 
the like – then, in contemporary circumstances, you have to understand the workings of the 
institutions in which knowledge claims are developed and tested.2  
Since activities aiming at “scientific growth” characteristically unfold, within the wider 
scholarly community, in a specifically disciplinary setting (e.g. philosophy or biochemistry), 
the institutions that constitute that discipline will be relevant to understanding the 
development and evaluation of those activities and their products and hence are, on the 
approach recommended by Blisset, of potential epistemological significance. 
Identification of the character and the affordances of disciplinary institutions will therefore 
constitute one crucial part of the analysis undertaken here. 
A second crucial part of the analysis attempts to extend the understanding of “scientific 
growth” and its facilitators and inhibitors. In particular, where “classical” philosophy of 
science understood “the dynamics of research” in terms of an “essential tension” (Kuhn, 1977 
[1959]) between conservative “normal science” on the one hand and, on the other hand, the 
challenges posed to normal science by anomalous phenomena or by heuristic degeneration 
into ad hoc adjustments of guiding (i.e. paradigmatic) ideas and models (see for example 
Kuhn (1970); Lakatos (1970)), later work has identified another potential impediment to or 
inhibition of scientific growth, one that only emerges clearly when enquiry is understood in 
terms of the collective activities of “communities” of researchers, rather than, as Wolfgang 
Stegmüller put it (1975, p. 94), in terms of a “statement view of theories”. 
In this paper I will therefore consider how there are strong institutionally-mediated reasons 
for scholars to shape their activities in ways that may threaten the growth of knowledge, in 
particular because or to the extent that incentives associated with research activity lead 
scholars into what Barbara Levitt and James March have called (1988, p. 322) “competency 
traps”. As Daryl Chubin and Terrence Connolly long ago put it (1982, p. 294, emphasis 
added): 
[T]here exist important pressures which lead to undue persistence of individuals in 
some research [approaches] rather than others; … the social processes associated with 
the development of these [approaches] tend toward conservative pressures for 
intellectual continuity on new entrants; and … the aggregate result of these processes 
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is that far from a wide dispersion of research efforts around the boundary problems of 
a specialty, there will be unproductive over-concentration on some few problems, 
while high-potential areas go underdeveloped. 
Notice that these phenomena of “undue persistence” and “unproductive overconcentration” 
don’t depend on anomaly or heuristic degeneration. These phenomena represent, as 
suggested, another kind of way in which growth of knowledge may be threatened, one which 
is about the demography of the research community, if you will, and one that can arise even 
in the absence of anomaly or ad hoccery. (It is notable, and regrettable, that, notwithstanding 
some attention to a related issue under the heading of Kuhn’s “risk-spreading argument”,3  
this issue has not been prioritized by mainstream philosophers of science.4) 
I will, therefore, hereafter consider the institutional conditions under which “unproductive 
overconcentration” can occur, and, crucially, the institutionally embodied opportunities for 
the avoidance or amelioration of such a threat to “growth of knowledge”. 
Obviously, it is an empirical matter how often and for how long and in what sorts of research 
specialties scholars fall into unproductive “competency traps”. It is nevertheless clear that, 
somewhere in the larger institutional ecosytems that superintend “scientific growth”, there 
are counter-vailing incentives or opportunities, since, demonstrably, communities of scholars 
do not always or inevitably become trapped in this particular way by their commitments to 
the paradigms that guide their research. In this paper, I will offer an hypothesis about one 
mechanism that might provide a counter-weight, for individual scholars, to the otherwise 
conservative incentive structure which they typically face, namely, the academic department 
as an institutional form and some of the affordances associated with the work-in-progress 
seminar which is, across a range of disciplines, such a conspicuous feature of scholarly life. 
While each individual within a research specialty may well face an incentive structure that 
rewards “normal science” conformity, every such individual will also find, in her 
departmental colleagues, potentially rich sources of “outside the box” thinking, and so long 
as some scholars effectively tap these sources, the desired “wide[r] dispersion of research 
efforts” may well ensue or at least be disinhibited.5   
I will show, then, how the dual institutionalization (Abbott, 2001, p. 126) of the disciplines 
may sustain a balance of opportunities and incentives, a “dynamics of research” in Blisset’s 
terms, that, when properly “tuned”, enables both collective persistence in established 
practices and exploration of “high-potential areas” outside the mainstream, thus sustaining 
“scientific growth”. 
I proceed as follows.  
In section 1, I consider the dual institutionalization of disciplines, in terms of departments 
and research specialties, noting, in the case of the specialties, that these are differently 
organized in different disciplines and focusing, for present purposes, on the organization of 
research specialties in particular kinds of disciplines – those described by Tony Becher 
(1989, pp. 79ff) as “urban” or by Richard Whitley (1984, pp. 193ff) as “polycentric 
professions”. In developing my analysis, I will consider two important “reference groups” for 
the individual scholar, namely, his departmental colleagues and his specialist peers. It will 
transpire, in due course, that colleagues have different contributions to make to a scholar’s 
research than his peers do. 
In section 2, I focus on one aspect of this dual institutionalization … namely, the research 
specialty and its supporting peer-group. In particular, I analyse the incentives and 
opportunities in play in “urban” or “polycentric professional” research specialties, 
concluding, as foreshadowed, that any given scholar is likely to focus her activities on well-
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worn research paths – such specialties as are the realm of Kuhn’s (1970) “normal science” – 
and, since the incentives for one are common to all, that the specialist peer-group is 
susceptible, as Chubin and Connolly pointed out (1982, pp. 294, 299), to an “unproductive 
over-concentration on some few problems” and hence, potentially, to “undue persistence in 
worked-out, low-yielding research” approaches by the relevant peer-group as a whole. This is 
the problematic phenomenon which it is my main business in this paper to understand. 
In section 3, I focus on the second aspect of this dual institutionalization … namely, the 
department and its collegium. In particular, I consider how, notwithstanding the potential for 
a peer-group to become trapped by a dominant research approach, each individual peer also 
belongs to a departmental collegium whose members can give the scholar access to forms of 
comment on or criticism of her specialist research work that she cannot expect to get as 
reliably from within the peer-group. Indeed, the collegium, assembled, perhaps, for a 
departmental work-in-progress seminar, can broker forms of knowledge and, indeed, forms 
of comment and criticism that create the potential for a “wider dispersion of efforts” within 
the research specialty. As Ronald Burt charmingly put it (2004, p. 388): “People connected to 
groups beyond their own can expect to find themselves delivering valuable ideas, seeming to 
be gifted with creativity. This is not creativity born of genius; it is creativity as an import-
export business.” And it is this business that may well be transacted in the work-in-progress 
seminar where, indeed, each participant is connected to groups (i.e. their various research 
specialist peers) beyond the one embodied in the seminar itself. Each participant potentially 
brings something from her peer-group to the assembled departmental colleagues that is not 
already common knowledge within the collegium and that therefore may be of value to the 
presenter in his role as specialist researcher. 
On this account, then, the successful pursuit of growth of knowledge depends, in “urban” 
disciplines, on how scholars balance incentives in play within a research field overseen by 
their specialist peer-groups on the one hand and, on the other hand, opportunities afforded by 
their membership of departmental collegia. The dual institutionalization of the disciplines is 
thus offered, in effect, as an antidote to threats to the growth of knowledge that are associated 
with “unproductive overconcentration” on “worked-out” lines of research activity. The 
analysis as a whole thus provides another interpretation of Kuhn’s resonant phrase “the 
essential tension”. On this account, that tension is between colleagues and peers and its 
management is important for “growth of knowledge”. 
1. The	dual	institutionalization	of	the	disciplines	
Following crucial earlier contributions (especially Becher, 1989; Toulmin, 1972; Whitley, 
1984), there is a growing literature on the disciplines (e.g. Abbott, 2001; Hyland, 2012; 
Jacobs, 2013; Krishnan, 2010; Lewis, 2013; Post, 2009; Trowler, Saunders, & Bamber, 
2012). Notwithstanding considerable diversity in their approach to the topic, most 
commentators agree about one thing: any given discipline has a dual aspect. (See for 
example Abbott, 2001, p. 126; Hamlyn, 1992, p. 128; Jacobs, 2013, pp. 28, 29; Toulmin, 
1972, pp. 142, 154; Whitley, 1984, p. 57.) 
For current purposes, the most perspicuous representation of the duality of a particular 
discipline is one that points, on the one side, at the departments through which that discipline 
is embodied at various universities and, on the other side, the numerous research specialties 
which disciplinary practitioners have developed. Associated with the department is the 
collegium, as I will call it, or the group of colleagues who jointly constitute the membership 
of that organizational unit. Associated with any given specialty is the peer-group, as I will 
call it, or the group of individuals who are recognized by each other as working on the same 
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scholarly problem or topic, as we can see through patterns of citation, choices of referees, 
attendance at specialist symposia, and the like. 
This particular formation is, of course, an historically contingent one. Indeed, disciplines 
themselves, in the modern sense anyway, are largely nineteenth or in some cases twentieth 
century institutional forms. The particular “lamination” of a department of colleagues 
consisting of representatives of a variety of specialist peer-groups arises, historically, with the 
formation of the modern research university and with the understanding, promoted by 
Wilhelm von Humboldt in relation to the University of Berlin, that teaching, a collective 
responsibility of departmental colleagues, is inextricably linked to research, carried out on 
any particular site by those same individuals, but in this case in relation, for each of them 
separately, to a dispersed peer-group of specialists investigating the same phenomena. 
Already anticipating some of the key points of the present analysis, Humboldt could, in 1809 
(translated by and quoted in Wellmon, 2015, p. 225), say that: 
The teacher isn’t present for the sake of the student alone. Rather, students and 
teachers come together for the sake of knowledge. … Indeed, the pursuit of the 
teacher’s own goal, knowledge, is best achieved through a linking of his strengths 
with those of his students. The teacher is more practiced, but for that reason, he also 
tends to be narrower in his views, and to have a less lively imagination. The students 
are less experienced, to be sure; but with greater openness, they strike out intrepidly 
in all directions. 
In any event, whatever the appropriate “origin story”, once the teaching-research nexus was 
established, and eventually propagated via North American initiatives at Johns Hopkins and 
Cornell universities (see for example Gerber, 2014, pp. 32-41), this laminated institutional 
formation was sustained on account of its functional stability. The logic is roughly as follows. 
Undergraduate teaching by colleagues institutionally sustains the department, for example via 
income from student tuition fees, in return for which students have opportunities to acquire 
skills and knowledge presented as valuable to their own personal and professional 
development that are, to close the loop, the products of the collective research activities of the 
peers who represent on that site the various research specialties on which the discipline 
supervenes. (See for instance Abbott, 2001, p. 126; Jacobs, 2013, p. 30.) If the genesis of 
dual institutionalization lies, as suggested, with the “Humboldt model” of the relationship 
between research and teaching, then the continued viability of this very model depends, in 
turn, on the reciprocal relationship between teaching, as a source of funding, and research as 
involving a set of skills that can be transmitted by teaching and that are recognized by 
students as a valuable personal acquisition. 
Diagrammatically, we therefore have something like this arrangement of departments and 
specialties, taking into account the point (note 5) that each department exists in a two-
dimensional space, with other departments of the same kind at other universities on the one 


















In the diagram, two staff at University I are engaged with the #1 specialty in discipline B, 
whereas no member of this department is engaged with the #4 specialty in that discipline. 
Members of the University I department have colleagues (fellow department members) who 
are engaged in three different disciplinary research specializations and three members of the 
University I department have a peer (at University II) working on the same specialty as they 
are. 
These two institutional aspects of the discipline – department and specialty – operate, 
notwithstanding their lamination, on different principles. 
The	Department	
While there will of course be differences among the various manifestations of the discipline, 
the department is typically charged, inter alia, with the 
•  provision of undergraduate education in the discipline, through a suite of courses 
constituting a major (field of study) and covering the main aspects of the discipline; and 
hence 
•  development of a curriculum and of pedagogy and assessment practices for the courses 
constituting the major (and including also such “service” teaching as the department 
might do for other programs at the university – e.g. Business Ethics, Statistics for 
Psychology, Chemistry for Engineering); 
•  recruitment and training, in the case of PhD-granting institutions, of postgraduate students 
at least some of whom will, in due course, be placed into tenure-track positions in 
university departments where they will, in effect, contribute to the reproduction of the 
discipline at those sites; 
•  recruitment, professional development and tenuring of academic staff; 
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•  management of adjunct or contract teaching staff and of other support staff; 
•  management of the department’s physical plant, its resources, including its budget, and 
the like. 
A department is constituted, essentially, by a group of colleagues, or collegium, whose 
members have joint responsibility for the various academic, administrative, management, and 
strategic aspects of the instantiation, at that location, of the discipline that they represent 
there. 
The word “collegium” is a term of art that I am using to characterize the members of a 
department that represents a particular discipline at a specific university.6 One of the key 
organizing principles for the department (as one element of the dual institutionalization of the 
discipline) is that it has to make adequate provision, in its staffing arrangements, in its 
collegium in other words, for expertise in each of the various subdisciplines or topical areas 
on the basis of which the discipline is arranged for teaching purposes. Typically, each 
member of the collegium will have been hired on the “one of each” principle, as D.W. 
Hamlyn put it (1992, p. 131), meaning, in particular, that each member of the collegium 
must, separately, command at least one of the subdisciplines or topics that the discipline 
supervenes on and, collectively, that the collegium as a whole must, ideally, command all the 
relevant subdisciplines or topics. It is only on this basis that the department can offer a major, 
taught by experts in the various subjects, that fully represents the discipline.7  
The collegium in any department of even moderate size and quality will therefore represent 
the discipline in its key constituent areas and special fields. The department is, in short, a 
microcosm of the discipline in this respect. This makes it, if you like, a “visible college”, on 
the model of Diana Crane’s influential idea of the “invisible college” (Crane, 1972, p. 53) 
which consists of influential research leaders, drawn from different research domains, who 
transfer information from their own domains to other members of the “college”. In principle, 
and bearing in mind that departmental colleagues may not all be “research leaders”, they are 
nevertheless in a position to transfer useful information from one subdisciplinary or topical 
setting to another, a matter of some importance, to which I return in section 3. 
The	Specialty	
One of the most distinctive features of the (contemporary and recent) disciplinary scene is the 
degree to which research activities are often highly specialized, so that, say within a given 
department, even a relatively large one, what one scholar is working on will overlap, if at all, 
with that of other scholars only at quite a high level of abstraction. As Crane already put it 
(1972, p. 12), scholarship “as a whole appears to consist of hundreds of research areas that 
are constantly being formed and progressing through [various] stages before tapering off.” 
Whitley (1984, p. 295) identified a key driver. 
Specialization has been encouraged by the large [post-War] increase in numbers of 
scientists competing for reputations … Thus scientists narrowed their topics and foci 
to avoid direct competition but have been able to claim contributions to intellectual 
goals … 
At a certain level of abstraction, all collegia are the same, whatever the discipline, because or 
at least to the degree that they all have the same basic responsibilities for teaching and 
management.  Notwithstanding some commonalities, peer-groups, on the other hand, will 
differ from one another, given the different ways in which the specialized scholarly research 
endeavor is organized in the various disciplines. Crudely, and using Becher’s typology (1989, 
ch. 5), there are “rural” and “urban” forms of research specialization. (Whitley’s analysis 
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(1984) is more complex and systematic, but, for my purposes, the urban/rural distinction is 
adequate.) As Becher put it (1989, p. 79): 
Urban and rural specialisms differ in a number of ways … Urban researchers 
characteristically select a narrow area of study, containing discrete and separable 
problems, where their rural counterparts typically cover a broader stretch of 
intellectual territory in which the problems are not sharply demarcated or delineated. 
The urban population is clustered around comparatively few salient topics, as against 
being spread out thinly across a wide range of themes. The urban mode is to tackle 
questions with relatively quick, short-range solutions, whereas rural researchers are 
liable to become engaged on long-range issues which may take years to puzzle out. 
For present purposes, I confine my attention to the urban disciplines, noting that this category 
encompasses a great many of the “hard” sciences and, latterly anyway, the discipline of 
philosophy, at least in the Anglosphere mainstream.8 
I note, in particular, three features of urban research specialties. 
First of all, in this kind of disciplinary research specialization, the peer-group, as Whitley put 
it (1984, p. 69), sets priorities and provides a general orientation to the researchable fields 
that it commands. Or, as Torgny Roxå and Katarina Mårtensson say (2009, p. 213), 
“academics tend to rely on … [a] rather large [network] involving sometimes hundreds of 
individuals, [which is] drawn upon for referencing and provision of guidance or orientation”.  
More specifically, it will be the peer-group that, as Chubin and Connolly put it (1982, p. 
293), identifies “some finite set of research topics which are seen as legitimate, interesting, 
and feasible by the members of the specialty.” (This is one way in which the “urban” 
disciplines differ from the “rural” disciplines … in the “rural” disciplines agenda-setting is 
not this restrictive; individual scholars are much freer to pursue research across a wide range 
of topics.) 
Secondly, it is the peer-group that defines and enforces the standards of evaluation against 
which any given scholar’s contributions to the development of the specialist research agenda 
are measured. As Stephen Turner says (2000, p. 52), “[t]he fact that a lot of people are trained 
in fundamentally the same way makes it possible for them to effectively make judgments 
about the quality of the work done by other people …”. Indeed, such a shared background 
might be necessary for such judgment. Certainly, Michael Mulkay thought so (1977): 
“[T]rustworthy assessments of the quality of a given piece of work can only be made by those 
who are working on the same or similar problems and who are known to be capable of 
producing results of at least the same level of quality” (quoted from Becher, 1989, p. 61, 
emphasis added). (Again, there are differences in this regard between the “urban” and the 
“rural” disciplines. In a “rural” setting, there may well be a range of different standards of 
evaluation as well as researchable topics, associated, perhaps, with different “schools” within 
the discipline, as, for example, with “close reading” versus “historicist” approaches to literary 
studies.) 
Thirdly, to the extent that the members of the peer-group, superintending a particular 
specialty, share priorities and standards in this way, they will, as Ken Hyland puts it (2012, p. 
205), draw on these shared resources as “important ways of signaling [to each other] a 
competent disciplinary identity”. (Cp. Sullivan, 1996, p. 231.) The peer-group will, then, be 
an important constituent, notwithstanding its geographical dispersion (especially as compared 
with the collegium), in an individual scholar’s professional persona. 
All this adds up to the fact that members of a particular specialist peer-group will read and 
expect to be read by individuals whom they meet from time to time at on- and off-site 
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symposia organized around the timely or significant issues within the specialty. Many of 
these interactions, real or virtual, will leave traces, in particular, in their citational practices as 
authors of research monographs or articles. As Diana Crane already noted (1972, p. 12), “the 
literature of basic science consists of tightly knit clusters of papers [citing each other]… 
[which] represent research areas, sets of closely related problems that … are viewed by the 
scientists who study them as discrete entities.” 
If individuals are, inter alia, “trained in the same way” and share a common understanding of 
which research topics are important and, indeed, of how to judge success in problem-solving, 
then, when an individual scholar interacts with the members of this sort of “social circle”, she 
encounters individuals who are, in relevant respects, a lot like her. She inhabits, in Burt’s 
terminology (1992, pp. 47, 17), a dense network where “[i]nformation circulates at high 
velocity” and “each person knows what the other people know”. Such common knowledge is, 
of course, an important resource, and permits the sort of persistent collective enquiry that 
will, even in the face of competition for recognition and esteem, create the conditions for 
normal scientific growth. 
Notwithstanding these crucial affordances of competent research practice, the facts that “a lot 
of people are trained in fundamentally the same way” and use the same standards to judge 
each other’s work and, crucially, work, typically, in narrower and narrower ranges have 
important implications for the phenomena, identified by Chubin and Connolly, of “undue 
persistence” and hence will be considered, in relation to the “dynamics of research” in the 
next section, where I will focus, pro tem, on one aspect of the dual institutionalization of 
disciplines, namely the research specialization and the peer-group whose activities embody it. 
Of course, any given peer is also a colleague, and I will consider the possible influences of 
his colleagues on his activities as a peer in section 3, thus acknowledging the other crucial 
aspect of dual institutionalization. Focusing initially on the specialization and its supporting 
peer-group will nevertheless bring us, I think, to a more complete understanding of what 
Humboldt had already noted about the specialist peer – namely, that “he … tends to be 
narrower in his views, and to have a less lively imagination.” This is, of course, precisely the 
issue that motivates this analysis. 
2. Dynamics	of	Research	in	an	Urban	Disciplinary	Specialty	
Work on urban research specializations shows some important “fine structure”. So, crucially, 
we have the ideas of blockbuster, research trail, and research front, which we can understand, 
crudely anyway, as follows.  
As Chubin and Connolly put it (1982, p. 295), a specialty “can be conceptualized as the 
confluence of several research trails, each representing a sequence of work by an individual 
or a small team of researchers … [and] distinguished by some continuity of focus – be it 
methodological-theoretical and/or problem-oriented – in published research”. (Hyland, 2012, 
p. 32 uses the term "topic" in roughly the same sense.) As Chubin and Connolly (1982, p. 
301) point out, within a given research speciality, 
the individual researcher and those powerful gatekeepers of the relevant hierarchies 
who control funding, publication, and acclaim acquire a reputational interest in the 
continuance of the trail. Indeed, accumulation of such interests lends legitimacy to the 
trail and advantages to prominent researchers within it … . 
If a research trail represents a diachronic feature of specialized research activity, the research 
front can be taken to represent the leading-edge of that trail. As Phineas Upham and Henry 
Small put it (2010, p. 16), repeating some points made by Crane: 
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New scientific findings may initiate the process of front formation by attracting the 
interest of more scientists who form social ties and generate more findings. The 
relevance and bearing of each new finding is continuously defined and evolved by the 
group. … This combined intellectual and social process is seen most vividly in the 
publications and citation patterns … It is manifest in the emergence of clusters of 
highly cited papers representing the key scientific findings that are cited jointly. 
Indeed, the characterization of a research front given here is highly resonant with a more 
florid description by Keith Brouthers et al. (Brouthers, Mudambi, & Reeb, 2012, p. 959) who 
argue for a proposition that they label “the blockbuster hypothesis”, namely, that “the 
creation of new knowledge is dominated by a few key insights that challenge the way that 
people think about an idea” and that these sorts of insights “generat[e] high interest and use”, 
especially when compared with the “numerous studies … [which] have little impact on the 
frontiers of knowledge” and hence attract very little attention and peer-group recognition. 
On this account, then, specialist research in urban disciplines is typically characterized by a 
blockbuster contribution, initiating a research trail, which develops into a research front 
which new entrants into the peer-group will encounter as a given and to which, for various 
reasons (to be considered shortly), they will orient in planning and executing their own 
research activities.9 
From the point of view of both new entrants and established scholars, there are, then, a 
number of factors which secure adherence to the priorities and standards definitive of the 
specialty. As Chubin and Connolly (1982, p. 293) put it, “individual researchers attempt to 
choose their research topics ‘sensibly’ – neither randomly nor omnisciently – in pursuit of 
bounded self-interest”. Noting that the parameters of “sensible” decision-making about topic-
selection and other research decisions are subject to considerable uncertainty, they say (1982, 
p. 294): 
The researcher must decide to pursue a trail with considerable uncertainty as to its 
final yield; and the uncertainty is greater for studies further down the trail than for the 
next one or two. It is this rising uncertainty that [means that] … the researcher’s 
planning horizon is necessarily quite restricted. 
In this context, there are a number of reasons why the individual scholar working in an urban 
specialty will characteristically choose to work on well-established research trails, rather than 
attempting to blaze a new one of her own. Taken together, these reasons constitute an 
explanation, I believe, for something that Kuhn alluded to … namely, the formation of a 
peer-group pursuing normal scientific work. They also explain the “dynamics of research” 
that sometimes foster “unproductive overconcentration” on “worked-out” lines of research 
activity.10 
First of all, writing about a topic already agreed, by the peer-group, to be legitimate and 
important reduces risk, compared with other options. (See for instance, Foster, Rzhetsky, & 
Evans, 2015, p. 877 for an analysis based on bibliometric examination of publication patterns 
in urban disciplines.) As Whitley put it (1984, p. 27), “few are going to risk their futures by 
trying to publish material which deviates widely from current orthodoxies”, including 
orthodoxies, established via the normal-scientific canonization of blockbuster research, about 
what it’s important to be researching. There are a variety of contributing factors here, 
including, especially that: 
•  many early career scholars are vulnerable, in terms of their career trajectory (Abbott, 
1999, pp. 140, 169): “the modal would-be author was now a young person whose career 
was at risk”; 
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•  the successful exploitation of existing templates is more tightly connected to rewards, or 
more generally, to feedback than is the development of new ideas and approaches 
(March, 1991, p. 73); 
•  a recognizably competent contribution is more easily made by running variations, in an 
unexploited area of the current research front, than it is by taking a wider or deeper 
exploratory approach which may be difficult to evaluate (Whitley, 1984, p. 101), 
•  a well-developed and widely-used procedure or approach is easier to use and more 
reliably produces results of some kind or another (Levitt & March, 1988, p. 322); 
•  the activities of scholars working on a mature research trail “cumulatively monopoliz[e] 
attention at the same time that attention is drained away from alternative modes” (Collins, 
1998, p. 15); and 
•  contributions will be judged for their worthiness, especially in relation to publication and 
citation, by members of the research specialty peer-group, who face the same choices 
(Whitley, 1984, pp. 87-88). 
Anyone who has acted as a referee or assessor will understand these points. Because or to the 
degree to which there is already widespread agreement about what topics are significant and 
what counts as making a contribution with respect to one of these topics, it is easier to assess 
work that is oriented to one of these significant topics and that shows the markers of being a 
contribution to that topic than it will be to assess work that, as it were (Collins, 1998, p. 15), 
“changes the subject” (or tries to) by introducing new and unfamiliar topics or by 
approaching even familiar topics in an unfamiliar way.11 Indeed, recent bibliometric studies 
seem to confirm this “bias” in favor of relatively restrained or conservative contributions to 
the literature. As Jian Wang et al. note (2017, pp. 1422, 1425): “novel papers encounter 
obstacles in being accepted by journals” because “evaluators give lower scores to papers that 
are highly novel”. (Cp. Boudreau, Guinan, Lakhani, & Reidl, 2012, pp. 24-25.) With 
standard-issue topics and criteria of significance, judgment is easier and, across different 
individuals, more reliable than it is otherwise. Furthermore, if a scholar attends a conference 
and presents a paper making a “conservative contribution to the literature”, there are sure to 
be members of the audience equipped to comment with some competence on his work … 
something that couldn’t as reliably be counted on with other choices of topic.  
Secondly, working on an established research trail doesn’t have the same “set-up costs” 
(Chubin & Connolly, 1982, p. 297) as would be associated with working on some other topic. 
Certainly, by the time a normal science trail has been established in a particular research area, 
scholars will have had to master the apparatus associated with that trail as part of their own 
postgraduate education or postdoctoral training and may well have had to teach the topic(s) 
for undergraduate students. They have already invested in mastering the apparatus, in other 
words, an investment on which they can continue to draw without significant additional 
effort. To tackle some other problem will typically involve higher costs in this sense.  
Thirdly, writing about an established topic using widely-accepted tools gives a scholar an 
opportunity to exploit “positive network externalities” (Teece, 1998, p. 523). So, in 
particular, because the tools and concepts they use are the same as those being used by 
others, what each does will complement what the other does, so that they can draw on the 
work of others in a way they couldn’t if they were, by implication, attempting to forge a new 
research trail of their own. Such a “well-trodden path” represents, in effect, a materialization, 
in Steve Woolgar’s terminology (1995, p. 163), of earlier research activities by others, so that 
the individual scholar setting out on such a research trail unavoidably encounters “off-the-
shelf” problems and tools which, as Philip Kitcher put it (2001, p. 112), “stabilize and 
solidify [and] … set the scene for the next set” of activities. They have a prefabricated tool-
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kit of concepts, problems, rhetoric, and techniques. They don’t themselves have to develop 
these tools de novo and, importantly, they don’t, if they employ these prefabricated elements, 
have to establish the legitimacy of their deployment. Accordingly, such an approach 
“decrease[s] the cost of learning” (Zhou, 2002, p. 262) and delivers “increasing returns” to 
participants (Arthur, 1994), making it, other things being equal, sensible to adopt such an 
approach. 
The individual scholar, on this account, is engaged, in the urban disciplines, in developing a 
research trail and there are, intrinsic to this situation, some potentially conservative pressures. 
In order for her work to be recognizable as making a contribution, she has to consider its 
topicality (is her project on the peer-group’s research agenda?) and its “soundness” (will she 
be seen by her peers as displaying competence in the use of the peer-group’s tool-kit?). These 
considerations may, and typically will, be enough to steer her choices in the same general 
direction as others, facing the same choice-situation as she does, thus creating the 
“overconcentration” that Chubin and Connolly have drawn attention to. There will therefore 
be, within the peer-group, a great deal of normal science “theory churning”, as Abbott called 
it (1999, p. 177), in which individuals run variations on a theme,12 thus avoiding the risk of 
being misunderstood or taken for incompetent, but only by risking, collectively, real 
scientific growth.13 As Chubin and Connolly put it (1982, p. 294): 
[T]here exist important pressures which lead to undue persistence of individuals in 
some research trails rather than others; … the social processes associated with the 
development of these trails tend toward conservative pressures for intellectual 
continuity on new entrants; and … the aggregate result of these processes is that far 
from a wide dispersion of research efforts around the boundary problems of a 
specialty, there will be unproductive over-concentration on some few problems, while 
high-potential areas go underdeveloped. 
This sort of development is what Levitt and March (1988, p. 322) call a “competency trap”, 
by which they mean, in particular, that scholars can, individually and collectively, default to 
the examination of approved topics using familiar tools because, to put it crudely, it is easier 
and less risky to do that than it is to pursue “the road not taken”. But all these easy choices, 
each sensible from the point of an individual scholar’s cost-benefit ratios (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 
33), mean that there is considerable collective risk that the peer-group will, in the language of 
Chubin and Connolly (1982, p. 299), “persist in [a particular approach] well beyond the point 
at which additional studies can be justified by their scientific yield”. As Jerry Jacobs put it 
(2013, p. 14), “[s]o powerful are these inward-directed forces that topics at the margins or 
peripheries of fields lie fallow and are neglected.” This is a threat to “growth of knowledge” 
that, as already indicated, is not reducible to or even very closely connected with anomaly or 
heuristic degeneracy. It is a threat that arises, if you will, not at the level of relations between 
statements (e.g. lack of evidential support for theories), but, rather, at the level of community 
demography – how diversely do individual members of a specialist peer-group enact their 
scholarly commitments? 
3. The	affordances	of	the	department	
As Chubin and Connolly put it (1982, p. 306), “[t]he challenge to science policy-makers is to 
find ways to offset, rather than exaggerate, the destructive feedback loops” that, on my 
account, generate conservative forms of activity (e.g. Whitley’s “minor variations” or 
Abbott’s “theory churning”, leading to “undue persistence”). 
My hypothesis is that one way to offset such feedback loops is offered by the kinds of 
commentary on her work that the scholar receives (or can receive) from her departmental 
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colleagues. My key point is that her colleagues differ in various crucial ways from her peer-
group, and that these differences may promote a loosening of the restrictions that the peer-
group might encounter and reinforce because or insofar as they give the scholar access to 
forms of comment on or criticism of her work that she cannot expect to get as reliably from 
within the peer-group.  
The	social	psychology	of	departmental	collegiality	
To be concrete and specific about this potentiality, I will embody in the departmental work-
in-progress seminar a number of features that will, of course, be present elsewhere as well in 
the disciplinary ecosystem. The seminar is, if you will, a metonym for what is certainly a 
diverse set of opportunities. This is not an innocent choice. Certainly, as Wellmon for 
example has noticed (2015, p. 235), it is the device of the seminar, developed at the 
University of Berlin in the early nineteenth century, that creates, historically, the conditions 
for the inculcation and application of the scholarly virtues: “It was the seminar that first 
disciplined the disciplines and institutionalized the logic of science … .” 
To avoid confusion, the seminar is an event or occasion in the working lives of the members 
of the collegium. There are, of course, other such events or occasions, such as departmental 
meetings, where administrative matters or hiring might be discussed. 
I consider five points about this sort of occasion.14  
First of all, because the peer-group and the collegium are organized on fundamentally 
different bases, when a scholar presents a departmental work-in-progress seminar, she will be 
in the presence of colleagues who, individually, command the various subdisciplines or 
topics and, collectively, command the discipline as a whole, at least at a certain level of 
abstraction. (This will, typically, not be the case with her peer-group, and, hence, with her 
conference audiences, the referees of her journal submissions, and the like.) More 
specifically, because or to the extent that there are, within other subdisciplines or research 
specialties, concepts, theories, or techniques that might be relevant to a scholar’s problem, 
these will, ceteris paribus, be more likely to surface in a departmental seminar than in a 
conference presentation, if only because these other areas of enquiry are represented by 
expert practitioners in the seminar audience as they might not be among the scholar’s peers. 
This means, in Burt’s terms (1992, p. 23), that the collegium is a “sparse network” of 
individuals – in contrast to the “dense network” constituted by the peer-group – because its 
members (who are, of course, each also members of one or more “dense networks” through 
their research affiliations) are not “redundant” – they don’t all know the same things – and 
hence membership of a collegium of this kind “ensure[s] exposure to diverse sources of 
information”. 
Secondly, because most members of the departmental collegium will not command the 
subdiscipline or topic and, a fortiori, the research trail to which the seminar paper is meant to 
be a contribution, their understanding of the issues, if any, is likely to be dated and partial, 
depending on their exposure, perhaps years before during their education and training, to 
then-current literature in the general area in which the work reported has been conducted. 
Departmental colleagues will therefore need, in order to follow the paper, to ask questions of 
the scholar that a fully paid-up specialty peer would not, ceteris paribus. (For there is, on any 
particular research trail, a lot of common knowledge and taken-for-granted assumptions, 
which don’t need to be thematized during discussion within the peer-group, that facilitate 
easier access to the argumentation of the paper.) The collegium will be able, in other words 
(Payne, Bettman, & Schkade, 1999, p. 246), to subject the research paper to a “sensitivity 
analysis”, which questions the dependence of the results of the argumentation in the paper on 
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assumptions made by the scholar, in some cases at least on the basis of a shared approach to 
this form of research. Certainly, one of the things we know, both from our own experiences 
as teachers, but also from the social psychology of knowledge-formation, is that it can, and 
often does, happen, as a result of such questioning, naïve from the point of view of the 
research trail, that the scholar is provoked to think more deeply than she has to when in the 
presence (virtual or actual) of others who share her assumptions. This is known, in the 
psychology literature, as “expectancy disconfirmation”, which, according to Norbert Kerr et 
al. (1996, p. 696, emphasis added), “has been shown to undermine judgmental confidence 
and promote more systematic processing of information”. A scholar’s colleagues’ naïve 
questions and comments in other words provoke her to double-check what she has taken for 
granted within a specialist framework of discussion and, at least sometimes, to begin to 
consider, or perhaps even to discover, that what has been taken for granted ought, at least, to 
be questioned and perhaps even to be abandoned. This is a kind of learning that is, ceteris 
paribus, less likely to occur within the specialist peer-group, where a shared set of 
assumptions makes expectancy disconfirmations less likely to occur. 
Thirdly, because, or to the extent that, departmental colleagues are (relatively) unengaged, 
perhaps even disengaged, from the scholar’s research trail, they will not be committed, as a 
matter of their individual scholarly identities, to any of the positions which peers working on 
that trail have articulated. Accordingly, if the scholar offers, as part of her presentation, an 
idea, an argument or a technique, that has a certain discursive status within the research trail 
peer-group, it will not automatically be marked, as it would be for the peer-group, as having 
that status for the departmental collegium, whose members can therefore assess it, and indeed 
discuss it, in perhaps quite a different way than it would be assessed or discussed by the 
specialty peer-group. Suppose, for instance, that the scholar offers an observation that would 
be controversial within the specialty peer-group, perhaps by departing in some ways from the 
current paradigmatic “template” for recognizably competent research, and thus perhaps 
opening up a point of contact with a “high-potential area … [which might otherwise] go 
underdeveloped”. Insofar as her observation is not marked as controversial in the seminar 
presentation, local colleagues encounter it without that understanding of its significance 
within the specialty. They will neither be bothered nor excited by the “controversial” aspects 
of the presentation and hence will not be focused, as a peer-group almost certainly would be, 
on these particular aspects. And this means, ceteris paribus, that all the various aspects of the 
scholar’s presentation are more likely to receive attention in the local, departmental seminar 
before colleagues than they would when the paper is presented, say at a conference or 
symposium, to a predominantly specialist audience, who will tend to focus on its 
“controversial” aspects, and, indeed, perhaps react rather repressively or slightingly to them. 
Fourthly, because the work-in-progress seminar is, in principle, an occasion for collegiality 
among scholars who are also mutually engaged in teaching and the administration of a local 
organizational unit (the department), because they have, at least in these matters, a shared 
responsibility to and for each other, the seminar paper will be heard in a different modality 
than the article submission will, at a later stage, be read by referees and editors. In particular, 
while there are sometimes, of course, difficult colleagues, who are anxious to score points at 
the expense of the scholar presenting his work, the default assumption at the work-in-
progress seminar is, typically, that this is a chance to contribute to the improvement of that 
work. (This is not the starting-point for most referees, who see their duty as involving triage 
and, at low-acceptance journals, as oriented primarily to rejection as the default judgment.) 
After all, the reputation of the department depends, in some measure, on the recognition that 
its various members receive for their contributions to the research trails with which they are 
engaged. (Cp. Brennan & Pettit, 2004, p. 209.) If there is something that colleagues, 
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individually and collectively, can do to improve the scholar’s work, with all that that means 
for its visibility and impact in (and, ideally, beyond) the specialist literature, then that is to 
their advantage as well. This doesn’t, of course, mean that they won’t be critical, but it does 
mean that their criticisms are presented in relation to quite a different assumption (than the 
one which governs the journal referee). In particular, department colleagues provide criticism 
relative to the assumption that it will, in its substance, and in its mode of presentation, aid the 
scholar in improving his work, and this may include, by the reasoning already considered, 
judging the paper by different standards than are likely to be employed by the peer-group … 
standards that may well offer the scholar an opportunity to consider less routine ways of 
contributing to the development of his specialist research trail. So, for example, the colleague 
will be interested, as the peer might not be, in how well the arguments and claims of the 
paper cohere with what is known in other subdisciplines or research specialties … and this 
may well contribute not only to the degree of innovation that the paper is able to display, but 
also to the likelihood that the paper will be read not just by the peer-group it was intended 
for, but also by other members of the discipline.  
It is important both to frame and not to exaggerate the claims that I have been making in this 
section. There are two, complementary provisos which it’s important to register. 
First of all, the individual scholar has to exercise her own judgment about the potential value 
of the comments her colleagues make about her work. Perhaps the seminar throws up ideas 
that extend or challenge or simply reframe conventional understandings within the specialist 
peer-group. The individual scholar still has to decide how to deal with these ideas. Perhaps 
she sees their potential value but is hesitant to pursue them for any of a variety of reasons (as 
sketched in section 2 above) … high “set-up costs”, the risk of being misunderstood or 
dismissed by the peer-group. Empirically, different individuals will react differently on these 
sorts of occasions; some will seize opportunities, while others will not. And of those who 
seize the opportunities to extend or challenge routine work on the research trail only some 
will secure peer-group up-take of their ideas and hence drive discussion onto a new trail or 
take it further than it would otherwise get along the existing trail. The point is not that it’s 
“automatically” the case that work-in-progress discussion is valuable from the point of view 
of the paper’s author or of the research peer-group which she represents. The point is, rather, 
that the seminar provides a certain kind of opportunity. How any given research trail evolves 
will depend, in part, on how individual scholars belonging to the peer-group which tramps 
that trail have reacted to their colleagues and to each other. 
Secondly, blockbuster contributions, founding new research trails, are rare. As Brouthers et 
al. put it: (2012, p. 959) “the creation of new knowledge is both difficult and rare … [and] is 
dominated by a few key insights that challenge the way that people think about an idea”. So 
the work-in-progress seminar is not and indeed cannot be a factory for the routine production 
of such contributions. That’s the matter that it’s important not to exaggerate. When the 
scholar presents her work to the departmental collegium, it is not guaranteed, indeed it is still 
very unlikely, that what happens there will so enhance her work that it comes, in due course, 
to have blockbuster status in her research specialty. On the other hand, having said that, 
something important remains. While it is not guaranteed and indeed remains (highly) 
unlikely, what the collegium might contribute and sometimes does contribute is more likely 
to facilitate the significance and originality of the scholar’s work than what she will typically 
get from her peer-group (with their common orientation to the current state of play on their 
shared research trail). There is no recipe for originality in growth of knowledge, but there is 
still a difference between being in the kitchen and not being there. The department, not the 
research specialty, is arguably, and perhaps surprisingly, the kitchen. 
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All these points, taken together, make it, I believe, more likely that departmental colleagues 
will assist in the diversification of research efforts than will specialist peers. If the problem of 
“undue persistence” has a solution, it is on account of the affordances of the disciplinary 
department. The two aspects of the dual institutionalization of disciplines therefore play 
complementary roles. The specialization and its associated peer-group function according to 
a logic driving individual researchers in a common direction (and hence can sometimes 
produce “undue persistence” or “overconcentration” of research effort). The department and 
its associated collegium provide, potentially, a counter-weight to this logic, fostering or at 
least disinhibiting more adventurous contributions by peers to their specializations, and thus 
offering an alternative to “undue persistence”. 
The	collegium	as	knowledge	brokers	
The idea of brokerage figures significantly in the literature, across a range of disciplines (e.g. 
Burt, 1992; Weick, 1976; Wenger, 1998), about innovation as a key aspect of the growth of 
knowledge. The key idea is that, to innovate, it can be useful and may be necessary to bring 
together ideas or methods that do not usually sit together, given the existing landscape of 
research trails and fronts. Someone who has access to more than one research specialty, then, 
may be able to “broker” relations between or among these specialties by offering an idea or 
method from one specialty to the peer-group in another specialty where this idea or method 
can play an important role in the growth of knowledge and the diversification of research 
activity. As Burt put it (2004, p. 355), “[p]eople familiar with activities in two groups are 
more capable than people confined within either group to see how a belief or practice in one 
group could create value in the other.” (These are Susan Leigh Star’s “wizards” (1995, p. 
107), “who know enough about more than one layer to perform rare cross-layering 
coordination” and, in particular, are able to guide those researchers working in their own 
specialist fields to work in other fields that might be relevant to achieving new insights.) 
We have an illustration of this, I think, in our discussion of the work-in-progress seminar. As 
indicated, there are specialists in a variety of different fields of enquiry in the room when the 
scholar presents his work who possess knowledge and skills that may be relevant to what he 
is discussing which are unknown to him because of the organization of research trails, and, 
typically, to most of his peers in his own specialist research trail. One of the affordances of 
the scholar’s embedding in the collegium is that it gives him access to standards and ideas 
that he doesn’t (automatically) get as a member of the peer-group. As Helen Longino put it 
(2002, p. 155) in a different, more general context:  
Membership in multiple communities may be a source of internal conflict, but it is 
also an epistemological resource. It permits an individual to compare standards and to 
assess (purported) knowledge produced and accepted in one community in reference 
to standards proper to another. It confers on individuals the ability to see things from 
more than one point of view or at least to understand that there could be more than 
one point of view about a given matter. 
Any member of the assembled collegium can be the broker in this situation. The scholar can 
himself initiate brokerage by “fishing” for expertise from his auditors. Or they can offer that 
expertise, seeing the possibility that something that they know may be relevant to the 
problem he is discussing. Of course, this requires mutuality and that has to be earned and 
managed. The scholar needs, for instance, to give more attention, than he would with a peer-
group audience, to the “set-up” of his problem, so that non-specialists, not sharing the 
common assumptions of the peer-group, can understand what’s at issue and can see why it 
might be important. And his interlocutors have to be willing and able to stretch themselves, to 
compute analogies while he is speaking, so that they can intervene with suggestions, or even 
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just queries, about the possible relevance of something they know from their own experience 
as specialists in other areas. This mutuality is likely to available, however: the reputation of 
each individual is enhanced by the standing of every other individual in his department, so 
helping the author improve his work can lead, admittedly by long and tortuous processes, to 
better opportunities for others as well. As Etienne Wenger put it (1998, p. 109): 
The job of brokering is complex. In involves processes of translation, coordination, 
and alignment between perspectives. It requires enough legitimacy to influence the 
development of a practice, mobilize attention, and address conflicting interests. It also 
requires the ability to link practices by facilitating transactions between them, and to 
cause learning by introducing into a practice element of another. 
Potentially, the stakes are very high in this sort of situation and for two reasons. 
First of all, this sort of brokerage can facilitate precisely the sorts of break-throughs that 
constitute or are at least candidates for being “blockbuster” contributions. As Crane says 
(1972, p. 104), “new fields are created in part by the discovery of a linkage between old 
fields”, a discovery that might well be facilitated, on my account, by the encounter between 
colleagues in some suitable departmental setting. 
Secondly, the potential for brokerage, via the mechanism of the work-in-progress seminar in 
our particular case, may, as Karl Weick put it (1976, p. 7), “be an elegant solution to the 
problem that adaptation can preclude adaptability.” This will take some explaining, but, to 
begin, here’s a key worry that sits underneath this whole exposition: There are strong 
conservative tendencies associated with at least the mature growth of any particular research 
trail; after a time of initial innovation, a great deal of what happens is relatively routine as the 
approach taken to the object(s) of enquiry becomes more standardized and better adapted, for 
instance, to the practicalities of postgraduate training and early-career pursuit of tenured 
employment. (Cp. Crane, 1972, p. 67.) As Norbert Elias puts it (1982, p. 4): 
As an advance in knowledge … , scientific innovation cannot be easily routinized. If 
it is, it may get stale, may stagnate, may follow a set track, and be tied to a prescribed 
method; its representatives may miss unusual openings, and may shun radical 
innovations. 
Or, translating back into Weick’s idiom, the increasing adaptation of the tools used on the 
research trail to the tasks they are deployed to undertake means, more or less unavoidably, 
that the tool-kit as a whole is less and less flexible in meeting challenges that might lie off the 
trail or that might block further progress along the trail. Accordingly, those committed to the 
use of those tools are more and more vulnerable in relation to such challenges. That’s what’s 
meant, I think, by the idea that “adaptation can preclude adaptability”. 
And how does brokerage help with this? By giving the well-adapted (but potentially 
vulnerable) scholar access to other specialist forms of enquiry, using other tools, deploying 
other concepts, and engaging with different objects of enquiry. These specialties, commanded 
by other members of the collegium, constitute “cultural insurance” in Weick’s diction (1976, 
p. 7) because, to be specific, they are only “loosely coupled” to the author’s specialty, in the 
sense that “the identity, uniqueness and separateness of elements is preserved, [so that] the 
systems can retain a greater number of mutations and novel solutions.” If and when her own 
specialty becomes over-adapted, she still has access to elements that preserve her own 
adaptability; she gets them, typically, not from her specialist peers, with whom she shares this 
challenge, but, rather, from her departmental colleagues. 
***** 
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The growth of knowledge is institutionally provided for, then, through, precisely, the dual 
institutionalization of the disciplines. Through the peer-group, the individual scholar is 
provided with an agenda materialized in the persistent collective development of a specific 
line of enquiry. Through the collegium, the individual scholar is provided with off-agenda 
ideas, tools, and standards and hence with a source of potentially new contributions to her 
chosen areas of research. There will, of course, be individual differences among scholars and 
these too are relevant. Not every scholar will take advantage of the affordances of her 
departmental collegium … but some will and while only some of them will succeed in 
“changing the subject” on their research trail, it is the balance between those who hew to the 
trail and those who establish new trails that we call the social dynamics of the growth of 
knowledge.  
Robert Rosenwein provides a nice overview of some of our themes. In particular, he draws 
attention to the central “tension” that is at issue within any discipline – between the demands 
for originality and the affordances of a conservative tradition of enquiry. He says (1994, p. 
262): 
[S]cience may be thought of as a social system vehicle for producing knowledge. In 
this sense, like any other social system, science is characterized by “group processes,” 
for example, recruitment of new members, socialization to group norms, facilitation 
of group cohesiveness, maintenance of group loyalty, and leadership for continuity 
and coordination. Further, in this formulation, there is conflict in science, as in any 
system, between the “conservative” tendency to preserve and protect those modes of 
thought and behaviour that have been successful and the tendency to tolerate and 
absorb new ideas, to provide an atmosphere where creativity and criticism can 
flourish, in short, to provide the possibility of change and growth. 
What we might claim to have shown, in our examination of the dynamics of research, is that 
there are different institutional spheres within which the conservative and creative forces can 
be given proper expression and that, between them, the balance might well be struck in 
certain cases. Because the individual scholar is a member both of a departmental collegium 
and of a specialist peer-group, he is exposed to opportunities and incentives for both 
conservative and creative responses to his situation. To be sure, he has to balance these in his 
own way. To be sure, different individuals will balance them in different ways. What is 
important, I think, is that there is, in effect, provision, within the dual institutionalization of 
the disciplines, for any given scholar to be faced with this problem. This, I believe, is the 
answer to “[t]he challenge to science policy-makers” which Chubin and Connolly have 
identified. This is the way “to offset, rather than exaggerate, the destructive feedback loops” 
that threaten the growth of knowledge. 
Here, in conclusion, are the key points: 
•  The research trail, with its associated peer-group, provides individual scholars with a pre-
existing apparatus for the conduct of disciplined research. 
•  The department, with its associated collegium, is organized differently and, in particular, 
represents the full range of subdisciplinary expertise. 
•  In the work-in-progress seminar, this “off-trail” expertise becomes available to a scholar 
working in a particular research specialty. 
•  The refreshment of mature and the inspiration for new research trails is therefore going to 
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1 My thanks to anonymous referees for a rigorous and helpful process of peer review. Thanks 
too to Professor Peter Høj, UQ Vice-Chancellor, for a period of leave during which the final 
versions of this paper were prepared. Thanks to Professor Peter Harrison for extending to me 
the hospitality of the UQ Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities. Thanks, finally, to 
Jerry Gaus, friend of the decades, whose own work has inspired my attempts to “naturalize” 
the accounts we offer of social knowledge-making. This work extends that, on the 
disciplines, already reported in (D'Agostino, 2012, 2016; D’Agostino, 2019). 
2 Compare Steve Fuller, who said (1988, p. 3), programmatically, that 
The fundamental question of the field of study I call social epistemology is: How 
should the pursuit of knowledge be organized, given that under normal circumstances 
knowledge is pursued by many human beings, each working on a more or less well-
defined body of knowledge and each equipped with roughly the same imperfect 
cognitive capacities, albeit with varying degrees of access to one another’s activities. 
3 See for example Kitcher (1990). The locus classicus is Kuhn (1970, p. 186). 
4 See the Google Scholar citations for Chubin and Connolly (1982) at 
https://scholar.google.com.au/scholar?cluster=2221477401454438821&hl=en&lr=&as_sdt=2
005&sciodt=0,5. 
5 I believe my account is complementary, rather than an alternative, to any internalist account 
because, of course, anomalies, should they be independently definable, still have to be 
noticed and acted on. The “dynamics of research” which I try to identify can facilitate or at 
least disinhibit noticing and acting. My account also provides for off-agenda scholarly 
activity even in the absence of acknowledged anomalies, and this is a strength, in my view, 
because or insofar as some “novel” developments in the disciplinary specialties are indeed 
the result of the recombination of previously isolated ideas, rather than a response to “crisis”. 
6 As Daniel Alpert has pointed out (1985, pp. 250-1), any given department itself exists, 
relationally, in a dual institutionalization, with its “sister” departments in the same university, 
with which it may be bound in degree programs, funding arrangements, infrastructure 
support, and the like, and with its cognate departments at other universities, with which it 
may compete and cooperate in various ways. 
7 Indeed, on some accounts (see, especially, Jacobs, 2013, pp. 27-28), this arrangement (of 
curriculum mapped onto collegium) is crucial for the viability of a discipline for at least two 
reasons. First of all, and locally, providing an attractive major for undergraduate students is 
the budgetary foundation of a department’s very existence in most university systems. 
Secondly, and globally, a discipline will be able reproduce itself only if it can train students 
according to a curriculum that will enable them, after further postgraduate study and research, 
to present themselves as fit to teach (elements of) that curriculum elsewhere. In any event, the 
work of the collegium as such will include (Hyland, 2012, p. 24) “[e]veryday local practices 
of teaching, supervision, research, marking and committee work”  
8 “Dynamics of research” associated with “scientific growth” in the so-called “rural” 
disciplines will of course reflect relevant differences. Where there is, as Becher puts it (1989, 
p. 157), a high problem to person ratio, or, as Whitley would say (1984, p. 88), a relatively 
low level of strategic or even functional dependence of one scholar on the work of others, 
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there will, arguably, be less risk of collective persistence in “played-out” research 
approaches. The risk, in these situations, is, rather, that knowledge will grow, insofar as it 
does, by an accumulation of unorganized materials rather than through systematization, 
leading to profounder insight. Accordingly, the role of dual institutionalization in “tuning” 
the “dynamics of research” will be different. 
9 This, if you will, is one approach to the “fine structure” of Kuhn’s “normal science”, which 
he describes (1970, p. 24) as follows: “Closely examined, whether historically or in the 
contemporary laboratory, that enterprise seems an attempt to force nature into the preformed 
and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies. No part of the aim of normal science 
is to call forth new sorts of phenomena … Instead, normal-scientific research is directed to 
the articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies.” 
10 While there are significant differences between “rural” and “urban” disciplinary research 
specializations, there are some analogies which render some of the points to be considered 
applicable to some instances, anyway, of research activity in “rural” specialties. Consider, for 
example, what might be called “the Foucault phenomenon”, where, across a range of 
humanities and social science disciplines, literary, historical and sociological studies were, 
from the mid-seventies, increasingly preoccupied with broadly Foucauldian approaches, 
which became, if you will, more or less canonical, at least in certain circles. (Foucault’s work 
had, at mid July 2019, nearly 930,000 Google Scholar citations; his h-index was 288.) While 
there was no agreement, even in this situation, about researchable topics, and hence no 
“unproductive overconcentration” on a narrow list of such topics, there was widespread 
agreement on the approach to be taken to researchable topics and this may well have 
constituted an instance of “unproductive overconcentration”, especially in light of the 
tenuous grasp, by many participants in this phenomenon, of the actual techniques associated 
with Foucault’s own work.  
11 This particular analysis shows most clearly, I think, how the widely-discussed distinction 
between contexts of discovery and of justification does not, in any event, cleanly map onto a 
distinction between empirical (e.g. historical or sociological) analysis, on the one hand, and 
logical analysis, on the other hand. Referees, readers more generally, are making decisions 
about how well justified an argument or thesis is, and we can understand what they are doing, 
e.g. in applying epistemologically respectable standards of assessment, in a way that is 
empirically informed. For acute commentary on the discovery/justification dualism, see Paul 
Hoyningen-Huene (1987). 
12 Another threat to growth of knowledge sits at a right angle to the unproductive 
overconcentration that Chubin and Connolly have drawn attention to. This arises even, or 
perhaps even especially, when individual scholars are running minor variation on approved 
themes using approved tools, for even this activity requires a degree of “novelty” at least in 
the sense that the results reported are not already part of the agreed corpus of disciplinary or 
specialist knowledge. So, in particular, in pursuit of such novelty, within the constraints of 
conservative normal science, it appears – and the relevant studies are now numerous – that 
many scholars report results that cannot be replicated or reproduced by others. This is the so-
called reproducibility crisis – worthy of examination in its own right. (See, for a good 
summary and references, The National Academies of Sciences, 2019.)  
13 Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit provide an important analysis (2004, p. 121): “It seems 
plausible that a system in which enquiry proceeds across a broad front may be superior to one 
in which all energy is directed at being the first to do what everyone else is trying to do. From 
the point of view of the system as a whole, it may be better to have scholars choose research 
agendas that are more speculative, and where the chance of each making a fool of herself (or 
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simply wasting time, coming up empty-handed) are non-negligible. … In other words, the 
system as a whole can pool risks that individual scholars may well find daunting. On this 
basis, there is a problem: individual scholars may choose research agendas that are on 
average too conservative.” 
14 It is important, as a proviso, to understand that I am describing, in what follows, some of 
the affordances of the departmental seminar – some of the opportunities that, potentially, it 
makes available to the scholar. Whether those opportunities are exploited, however, depends 
on two other factors: (1) whether the collegium participates effectively, and (2) whether the 
scholar who is presenting has the will to take advantage of what the collegium offers. These 
are non-trivial assumptions. 
 
